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The emergence, in recent years, of large financing deficits in the portfolio values 
of UK DB pension funds, along with changes in the way such funds are valued by 
actuaries, has led fund managers to increase the weighting of fixed income 
securities, including corporate bonds, relative to equities in the portfolios they 
manage. Since bond prices tend to be less volatile than those of equities, greater 
bond holdings are attractive in the context of an accounting framework which 
now values funds on the basis of the current market values of the assets they 
hold and does not permit the smoothing of asset values over time. When 
selecting the fixed income securities to be held in the portfolios they manage, 
fund managers will have regard to the credit ratings assigned to corporate bond 
issuers. Through a consideration of some key credit rating metrics, and a survey 
of some relevant literature, this paper seeks to shed light on the ways, and the 
extent to which, the actions of the credit rating agencies may impact upon the 
values of defined benefit pension fund portfolios. The paper is organized as 
follows. Section i provides a general introduction to the theory and practice of 
credit rating and notes the relevance of credit ratings to defined benefit pension 
funds. Section ii presents a discussion of pension fund portfolios and their asset 
allocations. Sections iii and iv analyse the significance of credit ratings and the 
behaviour of rating agencies for defined benefit pension funds. Section v draws 
some tentative conclusions and offers some suggestions on the  direction that 
future research on this topic might take. 
 
   2 
(i) Introduction 
 
Sovereign and corporate bond investors require a rate of interest that 
compensates them for the level of risk associated with holding a particular 
issuer’s paper. Thus, the cost to an issuer of raising bond finance is negatively 
correlated with investors’ perceptions of their creditworthiness. For this reason, 
issuers employ credit rating agencies (CRAs) to provide them with credit ratings 
that can be utilized by their investors. Bank for International Settlements 
estimates put the number of CRAs worldwide at between 130 and 150. Many are 
very small and serve niche markets. Probably the most well-known CRAs are 
Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s), Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch. The 
ratings provided by CRAs are not definitive statements of risk. Rather, they are 
expressions of a CRA’s opinion of an issuer’s creditworthiness.  
 
The theoretical explanation for the existence of CRAs lies in the contribution 
these entities make to the efficiency of bond markets. In short, CRAs reduce an 
issuer’s costs of capital by overcoming problems of asymmetric information and 
transaction costs. In a world without CRAs, investors would be forced to evaluate 
for themselves the creditworthiness of bond issuers. With only public domain 
information to go on, investors, like the purchasers of used cars in Akerlof’s 
market for lemons (Akerlof 1970), would be unable confidently to differentiate 
between bonds with different risk profiles. Consequently, they would demand 
excessively high rates of interest on low risk  bonds to compensate for this 
uncertainty. As part of the rating process, CRAs are able to access proprietory 
information which, though required for a comprehensive risk assessment of an 
issuer, is commercially sensitive and, therefore, outside the public domain.  
 
Even if investors had unrestricted access to all relevant information, private as 
well as public, they would face data collection and processing costs. For 
individual investors, these costs would be substantial when the universe of 
possible bond investments was large. Some potential investors would be 
discouraged from participating in the bond markets; others would seek to recover 
these costs from the bond issuers through higher interest rates. *1 Because 
specialist CRAs are able to benefit from information economies of scale, they 
enjoy lower costs of data collection and analysis. In addition, CRAs can return 
these lower costs to bond issuers in the form of upfront charges for their services 
rather than as ongoing interest payments. 
 
CRAs might also help to resolve conflicts of interest that can arise between the 
owners of financial assets, such as pension and mutual fund investors, and their 
agents, the fund managers Fridson (1999). Where the reward to fund managers 
is linked to investment performance, these agents will have an incentive to invest 
in high risk bonds to the potential detriment of their principals. Even though the 
owners of financial assets may lack the capacity to evaluate for themselves their 
financial exposure, they can use credit ratings to limit the level of risk to which 
they are actually exposed. They can do so by mandating fund managers to invest   3 
only in bonds that are rated above some minimum threshold, BB for example. In 
other words, credit ratings represent a means by which principals can discipline 
their agents without incurring high monitoring costs. 
 
CRAs use a system of letter grades to denote the probability of an issuer 
defaulting on their debt obligations. Grading systems vary between CRAs, but 
typically  range from AAA – the lowest probability of default – to C – the highest. 
As Table One shows, S&P also use a D grade to denote issuers who are 
currently in payment default. *2 As well as borrower ratings, individual bond 
issues are sometimes rated separately from the issuer and may or may not have 
the same rating depending on the nature of the issue. *3 Borrower ratings, the 
focus of this paper, are entity-specific. Thus, the subsidiaries in a consolidated 




Table 1: Credit-Rating Systems on Corporate Debt 
 
Moody’s grade  Moody’s  S&P  S&P’s grade 
Best quality  Aaa  AAA  Highest rating 
High quality  Aa  AA  Slightly below highest 
Upper medium  A  A  Strong 
Medium grade  Baa  BBB  Adequate protection 
Speculative elements  Ba  BB  Potential vulnerability 
Speculative  B  B  Greater vulnerability 
Poor  Caa  CCC  Identifiable vulnerability 
-  -  CC  Highly vulnerable 
Highly speculative  Ca  C  Bankruptcy filed 
Extremely poor  C  D  In payment default 
 
Source: Pilbeam (2005) p. 135 
 
 
Credit ratings are of crucial importance to defined benefit (DB) pension funds. 
There are two reasons for this. First, DB funds are major investors in bonds. 
Second, national regulations frequently prohibit DB funds from investing in bonds 
that are not rated ‘investment grade’, - that is not having a rating of BBB or above 
on the S&P system. Employer-provided DB funds exist to provide their 
beneficiaries with retirement pensions equal to some fraction of their 
preretirement incomes multiplied by years of service. The pensions provided are 
financed from a portfolio of assets – mainly equities and bonds (Blake 1992) - 
accumulated from active members’ *4 contributions and investment returns. In 
addition to retirement pensions, many DB schemes also provide their members 
with retirement lump sums and/or death in service and survivors’ benefits. 
   4 
Defined Contribution (DC) funds are the other major type of employer sponsored 
pension fund. The difference between the two types of pension arrangement lies 
in the relationship between contributions and benefits. With DB funds, benefits 
are fixed, but contributions are variable. In the case of DC funds contributions are 
fixed by the rules of the scheme – usually as a specified fraction of workers’ 
earnings – but benefits are variable *5. Retirement benefits from DC funds take 
the form of one-off lump-sum payments 75 per cent of which must be converted 
into life annuities in the insurance market. As with DB funds, benefits from DC 
schemes are paid from an accumulated fund. The levels of benefits received by 
DC fund members depends on three variables: their total contributions, the 
investment returns these contributions earn and annuity rates *6at the time 
benefits are taken. Blake (2000) provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
different advantages and disadvantages associated with membership of both 
types of pension fund.  
 
Credit ratings are of importance to DC funds because, like their DB counterparts, 
DC funds are major investors in fixed income securities. However, because of 
differences in the liability structures of both types of fund, the rating behaviour of 
CRAs is, arguably, of greatest significance for DB funds. As the following section 
shows, DB funds are particularly vulnerable to actuarial deficits. Although DC 
funds can fall into deficit, (Institute of Actuaries, 2005) the circumstances under 
which this can happen, and the potential implications for sponsoring employers, 
are much more restricted than for DB funds. 
 
 
(ii) DB Pension Fund Portfolios 
 
The asset types that are typically held in DB pension fund portfolios include cash, 
equities, fixed income and index-linked bonds, property, and collectibles such as 
precious metals, antiques and works of art (Blake, 1992). Fund managers seek to 
hold these different asset classes in proportions that match the liability structures of 
their funds. The total liabilities of a DB pension fund derive from the combined 
claims  of  three  separate  groups:  current  pensioners,  current  contributors  and 
deferred  pensioners.  DB  funds  have  an  immediate  financial  obligation  to  those 
members who are already in retirement. They also have a future liability to pay 
retirement benefits to those who are currently accruing pension rights through their 
membership contributions and to former members who, though they have left the 
scheme, retain an entitlement to receive their accrued pension rights when they 
reach qualifying age. 
 
Because asset types differ in their risk/return characteristics, some assets are more 
appropriate  than  others  for  matching  particular  components  of  DB  fund  liability 
structures. The most pressing liabilities, retirement and other benefits in payment 
and the entitlements of members soon to retire, need to be matched with assets 
that  yield  an  immediate  income  at  relatively  low  risk,  namely  cash  and  bonds. 
Equities, collectibles and property, on the other hand, though more volatile, have   5 
the  growth  potential  to  match  the  more  remote,  but  less  predictable,  liabilities 
represented by current contributors and deferred pensioners. While DB fund assets 
are valued on the basis of their current market values, liabilities are subject to three 
different valuation regimes (Blake 2001). 
 
Financing surpluses and deficits can arise for DB funds, due to asymmetric rates 
of growth of assets and liabilities. Indeed, Bodie (1990) cites the potential for 
financial surpluses to arise as one of the main reasons why firms fund their DB 
pension schemes rather than financing them on a pay-as-you-go basis. A surplus 
of assets over liabilities can act as a cushion against future deficits. It can also 
reduce a firm’s pension costs and, where regulation permits, constitute a ready 
source of additional finance for the firm. The possibility of benefitting from a 
pension scheme surplus is an important explanatory factor for firms’ willingness  
to accept the risk of being called upon to make additional payments to their 
schemes in the event that assets fall short of liabilities.  
 
Throughout the 1980s, financial surpluses were the norm for many DB pension 
funds. Indeed, some schemes built up surpluses which were considerably greater 
than the market values of their sponsoring firms. These surpluses arose for two 
main reasons (Sullivan, 2004). First, large numbers of workers were leaving final 
salary schemes early, as firms sought to boost efficiency by shedding labour. This 
had the effect of slowing down the rate at which pension liabilities grew. Second, 
the value of pension scheme assets - an increasing proportion of which were being 
invested in equities - rose rapidly due to a booming stock market. For example, the 
value of assets held by UK pension schemes rose from around £40 billion, at the 
end of 1979, to £150 billion at the end of 1985 (Griffiths 1986). 
 
By the mid 2000s, the financing positions of most DB pension funds differed from 
those of the 1980s in two important ways. First, the financial surpluses of the 
1980s had given way to sizeable funding deficits. The combined pre-tax deficit 
for the FTSE-100 companies stood, in 2005, at £60Bn *7, 5 per cent of market 
capitalization (Gallagher, 2005). Second, the weightings given to equities in DB 
pension fund portfolios had fallen in favour of increased bond holdings. In 2003 
the average equity allocation was 68 percent, down from 76 per cent in 1995. 
This figure had fallen to 61 per cent by 2007 (Frank, 2007). Whereas the average 
allocation of DB pension fund portfolios to bonds stood at 14 per cent in 1995, 
and 19 per cent by the end of 1998, it had risen to 36 per cent by 2007.    6 
Table 2: Average portfolio allocations of UK DB Pension Funds to equities 
and bonds (%), 1995-2007. 
 
  Equities  Bonds 
1995  76  14 
1998  72  19 
2003  68  28* 
2007  61  36 
* Author’s estimate. 
 
Sources: Davis (2001), Frank (2007). 
 
A number of reasons can be adduced for the increased importance currently 
being given to bonds in the portfolios of UK DB pension funds. These include 
scheme maturation (Davis, 1995), changes in the fiscal status of equities 
(Sullivan 2004) and, most important of all, the reactions of DB pension fund 
managers and trustees to an evolving regulatory and accounting environment 
(Blake, 2001; Davis 2001). In maturing schemes the ratios of immediate to long 
term liabilities are rising, due, for example, to increasing life expectancy. 
Consequently, fund managers of such schemes would be expected, in line with 
the principles of asset and liability matching, to increase the proportion of bonds 
they hold relative to equities. The withdrawal, in 1997, of dividend tax credits for 
pension funds made bond holding more attractive, by introducing a measure of 
taxation on income from equities, but leaving bond income tax exempt. 
 
Since the mid 1990s, UK DB fund managers and trustees have had to adapt to a 
series of changes to the regulatory and accounting environment in which they 
operate. Coming in the wake of the Maxwell scandal, these regulatory and 
accounting changes boil down to: a reduced tolerance of deficits and surpluses – 
through a minimum funding requirement - statutory indexation of benefits – in 
payment and deferred - valuation of fund assets on the basis of their current 
market values – replacing a system of actuarial valuations and long term 
smoothing - and a requirement that the financial position of a firm’s DB pension 
fund be recorded as an item on its balance sheet. The upshot of all these 
changes appears to be an increasing tendency for fund managers and trustees 
to favour asset allocations that minimize the short term volatility induced mis-
match between assets and liabilities. That is, because bonds exhibit lower price 
volatility compared with equities, there is now a regulation induced bias towards 
greater bond weightings in DB fund portfolios. 
 
 
(iii) Ratings and the Rating Process 
 
Although capital markets have existed for several centuries, the rating of bond 
issues by independent agencies is a twentieth-century phenomenon. John 
Moody is credited with establishing the practice in 1909, followed in 1916 by the   7 
then late Henry Poor’s Poor Company. In effect, Moody fused together the 
separate investor information functions carried-out in the U.S at that time by 
credit reporting agencies, the specialized financial press and investment bankers 
(Sylla, 2001). For sixty years or so after their inception, CRAs earned the bulk of 
their income from fees charged to investors for supplying them with rating reports 
on bond issuers. It was not until the early 1970s that the current practice of 
charging borrowers themselves for a credit rating was adopted *8. The switch to 
issuer charging seems to have been motivated in part by concerns amongst 
CRAs that the growing availability of cheap photocopying would undermine their 
income base by encouraging free-riding. *9 
 
A credit rating is not an objective measure of a bond issuer’s creditworthiness. 
Rather, it is the expression of a CRA’s opinion of the issuer’s likelihood of default. 
As well as credit ratings, CRAs also provide investors with a number of other 
credit opinions. These are referred to as credit assessments. They include 
private credit assessments (PCAs) and quantitatively derived assessments 
(QDAs). The difference between credit ratings and assessments lies in the 
methodologies used in their production. Credit ratings are ‘interactive’, credit 
assessments are not. 
 
The routine work involved in rating a particular bond issuer is carried out by the 
CRA’s in-house industry analysts under the supervision of its rating committee. 
Ratings are interactive in the sense that the firm being rated will supply its CRA 
with information about itself that is not publically available. Once an issuer’s 
credit rating has been determined, a credit report and outlook statement are 
produced. The credit report consists of a detailed explanation of the rationale for 
the rating assigned to the issuer, focusing on industry and issuer-specific risks. 
The outlook statement, which usually forms part of the credit report, indicates 
whether the assigned rating is likely to change and, if so, in which direction. A 
positive outlook implies that a future upgrade is likely, with the converse being 
signified by a negative outlook. Where a stable outlook is produced, this signifies 
that no change to the assigned grade is currently envisaged. Rated issuers are 
subject to continuous monitoring by their CRAs’ and, at least once a year, to a 
formal rating review.  
 
In the UK, most of the top 250 FTSE companies have interactive ratings from a 
major CRA (Institute of Actuaries 2005). Although the majority of credit ratings 
are produced in response to a request from the issuer, CRA’s will sometimes 
assign issuers with unsolicited ratings which they produce on a non-interactive 
basis. As unsolicited ratings are likely to be less favourable, however, most 
issuers are willing to pay, since a stronger rating will reduce their cost of capital. 
CRAs claim that the interactive rating process permits them to produce ratings 
that reflect an issuer’s intrinsic quality. They also claim to rate through the cycle. 
That is, they try to produce ratings that will remain broadly stable over the 
business cycle.  
   8 
Globally, the market for credit ratings is dominated by the three big U.S CRAs. 
Together, Moody’s, S&P and Fitch produce the vast majority of general bond 
ratings. One explanation for this global oligopoly is that to be successful CRAs 
must possess a strong reputation in the market. Without this, their ratings will 
lack credibility. Since reputation is only built through long experience of rating a 
wide range of issuers, it constitutes a high barrier to potential market entrants. 
Whilst recognizing this point, White (2002) also notes that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) ‘nationally recognized statistical rating 
organization’ (NRSRO) designation plays a major role in keeping the global credit 
rating market oligopolised. The SEC instituted the NRSRO designation in the mid 
1970s to answer the question of which CRA’s ratings counted for the purposes of 
ratings-based regulation. To date, the SEC has assigned the NRSRO 
designation to just a handful of CRAs. Partnoy (2007) argues that the NRSRO 
designation confers benefits on the designated CRAs that he calls’ regulatory 
licenses’. He suggests that, because of regulations which prohibit fund managers 
from investing in bonds that have not been given some threshold rating by an 
NRSRO, CRAs are able to generate economic rents that persist even when they 
perform poorly. 
 
The data in Table Three show that a strong negative correlation exists between 
the perceived credit quality of borrowers and the yields available on corporate 
bonds. Bond yields rise sharply as credit quality deteriorates. Put another way, 
since bond income is fixed in nominal terms, a positive relationship exists 
between an issuer’s credit rating and the market price of their bonds. A reduction 
in an issuer’s credit rating will cause the market price of their bonds to fall, 
whereas an uprating would have the opposite effect. Similar observations can be 
made from the data on quality spreads shown in Table four. The quality spread 
measures the difference in yields on risky assets – such as corporate bonds - 
and risk free assets – e.g. UK  or U.S government bonds - whose characteristics 
are otherwise identical. An interesting feature of the data in Table Four – but one 
not analysed in detail here - is the observable difference in the shape of the term 
structure of quality spreads, being upward sloping for higher rated bonds, hump 
shaped for BBB grade bonds and downward sloping for all lower grades.  
 
 
Table 3: Moody’s Average Long term Corporate Bond Yield by Rating 
Category, (%) 1980-2004. 
 
AAA  Aa  A  Baa 
8.92  9.24  9.56  10.02 
 
Source: Pilbeam (2005)   9 
Table 4: Average Credit Quality Spread by Rating Category and Maturity, 
January 1997 to August 2003, in Basis Points. 
 
  1-3 years  3-5 years  5-7 years  7-10 years 
AAA  49.50  63.86  70.47  73.95 
AA  58.97  71.22  82.36  88.57 
A  88.82  102.91  110.71  117.52 
BBB  168.99  170.89  185.34  179.63 
BB  421.20  364.55  345.37  322.32 
B  760.84  691.81  571.94  512.43 
 
Source: Amato and Remolona (2003) 
 
 
Although credit ratings are only expressions of rating agencies’ subjective 
assessments of the creditworthiness of particular bond issuers, CRAs also 
publish a range of statistical data on their ratings which give these ‘opinions’ a 
measure of objective validity. Two main types of data are published: default and 
recovery measures and measures of rating migrations. In the first case, 
information is published on the probability of default for each and every rating 
category and on the likely scale of losses arising from such defaults. Annual 
default counts and rates are published showing the frequency of defaults 
amongst all issuers, and amongst issuers in the different rating categories. The 
same data is also published in cumulative formats covering various time periods, 
e.g. two, three, four and five years. Since a default does not necessarily imply a 
total loss for the investor, CRAs also publish annualized and cumulative loss and 
debt recovery statistics. 
 
As tables five and six show, default rates are currently very low, and are 
especially low amongst those issuers rated as investment grade. Thus, there is 
statistical support for the claim’s of CRAs that their ratings possess a high degree 
of reliability. In other words, the lower the rating category assigned to an issuer 
the greater the probability of their defaulting on their debt obligations. The Gini 
coefficient is a useful summary metric for the relationship between credit ratings 
and the probability of default. The Gini coefficient can take on any value between 
zero and 1. If defaults were randomly distributed across all rating categories, the 
Gini coefficient would equal 0. If defaults occurred only amongst issuers at the 
bottom end of the rating scale, it would equal 1. One year, three year and five 
year Gini coefficients for Fitch and S&P rated issuers are shown in table seven.   10 
Table 5: Global Issuer Default Counts and Rates (2007) by Credit Rating 
Agency 
 
  Number  Rate 
Moody’s  18  0.31 
Standard and Poor’s  22  0.36 
Fitch  3  0.10 
 
Source: Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. 
 
 
Table 6: Proportion of all S&P Defaults Involving Issuers with Ratings 
Below Investment Grade in Selected Years 
 
  1990  1995  2000  2003  2005  2007 
Total defaults  69  35  136  121  39  22 
% non-investment grade  97  97  95%  96  97  100 
 
Source: S&P and authors calculations 
 
 
Table 7: Single and multi-year Average Fitch and S&P Corporate Issuer Gini 
Coefficients. 
 
  1-year  3-year  5-year 
Fitch  0.87  0.78  0.76 
Standard and Poor’s  0.83  0.76  0.74 
 
Source: Fitch, S&P. 
 
 
The second type of summary metrics produced by CRAs - migration rates - are 
published in the form of transition matrices. Probabilities can be derived from 
these matrices to determine the likelihood of issuers with particular ratings being 
subject to a rating change during a given period. Grade migrations are, in fact, 
much more common than actual defaults. As Table eight shows, on average, 
11.47 per cent of S&P’s AAA rated issuers and 15.87 of those rated BBB could 
expect to experience a rating change during any twelve month period. Table nine 
shows the proportions of S&P rated issuers with different grades that, on 
average, can expect either an upgrade or a downgrade over the period of one 
year.   11 
Table 8: S&P Global Average Migration Rates (%), 1981-2007 
 
  1 year  3 year  5 year 
AAA  11.47  31.22  46.85 
AA  12.50  33.03  48.40 
A  12.79  32.85  46.91 
BBB  15.87  39.43  53.28 
BB  24.38  56.27  72.24 
B  27.00  62.62  79.49 
CCC-C  52.62  86.69  96.27 
 
Source: Standard and Poors 
 
 
Table 9: Probability of an Upgrade or Downgrade for S&P Rated Issuers by 
Letter Grade Over a 1-Year Period 
 
  AAA  AA  A  BBB  BB  B  CCC-C 
Upgrades  0.00  0.60  2.11  4.14  5.60  6.41  13.36 
Downgrades  11.49  11.91  10.61  11.52  17.77  16.01  13.67 





(iv) Credit Ratings and Pension Fund Portfolios 
 
Credit ratings are of importance to pension funds because, like other bond 
investors, these funds are vulnerable to losses should the issuers of the 
securities they hold default on their debt obligations. Credit ratings denote a 
CRA’s assessment of an issuer’s likelihood of default. Therefore, as long as 
these ratings are reliable, pension funds should be able to minimize their 
exposure to default losses by holding the securities of only the most highly rated 
bond issuers. Data presented in the preceding section shows that, as predictors 
of default, credit ratings are indeed fairly reliable. Defaults occur most often 
amongst issuers with ratings in the bottom half of the rating scale and are 
relatively rare amongst those with an investment grade credit rating. Moreover, 
as Table ten shows, even where defaults do occur amongst investment grade 
borrowers, average loss rates tend to be rather low.    12 
Table 10: Average Expected Credit Losses by Rating Category and 
Maturity, January 1997 to August 2003, in Basis Points. 
 
  1-3 years  3-5 years  5-7 years  7-10 years 
AAA  0.06  0.18  0.33  0.61 
AA  1.24  1.44  1.86  2.70 
A  1.12  2.78  4.71  7.32 
BBB  12.48  20.12  27.17  34.56 
BB  103.09  126.74  140.52  148.05 
B  426.16  400.52  368.38  329.40 
 
Source: Amato and Remolona (2003) 
 
The reliability of credit ratings as predictors of default is not the only criterion on 
which to judge their significance for DB pension funds. Account must also be 
taken of rating stability. This is because changes in the ratings of issuers whose 
bonds are held by pension funds – particularly rating reductions – can have a 
number of negative effects for such funds. An obvious example is where the 
managers of a fund are mandated, either by statute or by the fund’s trustees, to 
hold only investment grade bonds. Where an issuer is downgraded from 
investment to speculative grade, the fund manager would be required to liquidate 
their holdings of that issuer’s bonds, either immediately or within a prescribed 
period. Thus, changes in credit ratings have implications for both the initial and 
ongoing asset allocations of DB pension fund portfolios. 
  
Because bond yields and spreads respond to changes in credit ratings, as shown 
in Section Three above, rating changes can affect the market values of pension 
fund portfolios as well as their asset allocations. Moreover, rating changes are far 
more common than defaults. Thus, the price effects of rating changes, rather 
than the default rates associated with particular rating grades, are likely to be of 
most significance for DB pension funds. Recent research, see for example 
Gonzalez et al (2004) and the literature cited therein, points to both direct and 
indirect price effects of ratings changes for DB pension fund assets. 
 
When bond issuers experience a rating change, there will be an immediate and 
direct price effect on the portfolios of funds which hold their bonds, due to the 
inverse reaction of bond yields and spreads to rating changes. Upgrades will 
raise the total market value of assets in pension fund portfolios by driving down 
the yields on the affected bonds. The reverse would be true for downgrades. 
Clearly, the extent to which the market value of any particular fund is vulnerable 
to these direct bond price effects depends upon that fund’s level of exposure to 
particular bond issuers. Since professional fund managers can be expected to 
limit their exposures to any individual issuer by holding a diversified set of fixed 
income securities in the portfolios they manage, there is good reason to conclude 
that these direct bond price effects are likely to be relatively small.  
   13 
As well as their effects on bond prices, rating changes also have direct impacts 
on the affected issuer’s equity price (Dichev and Piotroski, 2001). These equity 
price effects arise because of the signalling properties of credit ratings and rating 
changes. In an efficient market, a bond issuer’s equity price will embody all 
current information relevant to the valuation of that entity. When new information 
arises that implies a change in the value of the firm, it will quickly be absorbed 
into the firm’s equity price. Ratings changes convey just such new information. 
Thus, downgrades, which imply reductions in firm values, can be expected to 
cause those firms’ equity prices to fall (Campbell and Taksler 2003, Klinger and 
Sarig 2000). There is some evidence that equity market reactions to rating 
changes are asymmetrical, with stock returns reacting more strongly to 
downgrades than to upgrades (Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich 1992, Ederington, 
Goh and Nelson 1996). The magnitude of equity price reactions to rating 
reductions is, of course, likely to be greatest when downgrade announcements 
are unexpected.  
 
Like the direct bond price effects, the equity price reactions to rating changes on 
DB pension fund portfolio values might be expected to be small for well 
diversified portfolios. However, when combined with the indirect effects, the total 
impact on the market values of pension fund portfolios arising from changes to 
the credit ratings of corporate bond issuers has the potential to be much more 
significant. Indirect effects on DB pension fund portfolios arise because the price 
reactions arising from rating changes can be shown to extend beyond the market 
values of the affected issuer’s own bonds and equities (Gonzalez et al 2004). 
That is, downgrades can have negative impacts on the bond and equity prices of 
a downgraded firm’s rivals as well as upon those of the firm itself. The actual size 
of these rating change spill-overs differs between firms, depending upon their 





The rating actions of CRAs have an influence on the choice of fixed income 
securities selected for inclusion in the portfolios of UK DB pension funds because 
only the most highly rated bonds will be chosen. CRAs also influence the values 
of DB fund portfolios through the impact that changes to their published ratings 
have on bond yields and spreads. At first sight, then, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the rating actions of CRAs have become increasingly important for 
UK DB pension funds, given the more than doubling of bond weightings in DB 
fund portfolios since 1995 and the desire, amongst fund managers and trustees, 
to reduce the potential for volatility mis-matches to arise in the values of their 
schemes’ assets and liabilities. However, because changes to credit ratings have 
been shown to have indirect as well as direct impacts on DB pension fund 
portfolio values, two further conclusions can be drawn. In the past, the rating 
actions of CRAs would have been of considerable importance to UK DB pension 
funds, even though the bond allocations in these funds’ portfolios was, by today’s   14 
standards, relatively low. Consequently, the significance of CRA’s rating actions 
for UK DB pension funds may not have risen in direct proportion to the increase 
in the bond weightings of these funds’ investment portfolios.  
 
Further investigation of this topic is required in order to quantify the degree to 
which the significance of CRA’s rating actions has increased for UK DB pension 
funds. In particular, account needs to be taken of three issues which are not 
analysed in any detail in this paper. These are: 1 the frequency of rating 
changes, 2 the stability of the correlation between rating grades and bond yields 
and spreads and 3 the extent to which the price effect on equities associated with 





1. Many potential investors would also lack the necessary analytical skills.  
 
2. Sometimes plus and minus signs are incorporated into the rating system. 
 
3. e.g. subordinated, unsecured or secured. 
 
4. those currently in employment who are accruing future pension entitlements. 
 
5. Workers’ contributions are those made by themselves, plus any made on their 
behalf by their employers. In the case of non-contributory schemes, contributions 
are made exclusively by the sponsoring employer. 
 
6. The annuity rate is the value of an annual annuity payment expressed as a 
percentage of the lump-sum used to purchase it. 
 
7. Calculated using FRS17 accounting rules. 
 
8. Partnoy (2007) puts these charges at three to four basis points of the face 
value of a typical bond issue. 
 
9 According to Partnoy (2007) roughly 90 per cent of CRA’s income is derived 
from charges on bond issuers. 
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